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Initially my aim was to bring together the following – the early Hegel 
(particularly his early theory of spirit in connection to his theory of 
Fate and his early critique of Kantian morality) the religious thinking of 
William James1 and the work of three contemporary philosophers, 
John McDowell, Charles Taylor and A.W. Moore.  I then intended to 
use this material to rethink secularism, particularly the normative 
constraints that ground the separation of church and state.  It is this 
division that is the ultimate focus of this paper.  Some see that this 
division is of secondary importance to a more fundamental issue, 
captured under the Weberian term ‘disenchantment of nature.’  To an 
extent I agree with them but through a consideration of Hegel’s early 
theory of spirit my aim is to show that prior to any disenchantment of 
nature that there exists a problematic conceptual or perhaps an 
attitudinal relation to self and world and that this is a pre-condition of 
such disenchantment. At the practical level this problematic relation 
of self and world manifests in institutional division and at a theoretical 
level the same relation manifests as disenchantment.  So, before we 
can begin to see the world as the realm of law,2 devoid of meaning 
and disenchanted, we have to adopt a certain reactive attitude to it.  
This attitudinal relation is one that I think is based in a fundamental 
fracture, a form of self-alienation, whereby the self is held to be 
something alien to nature yet imprisoned within the natural.  This 
fundamental fracture then manifests in human institutional and 
intellectual life as seemingly irreconcilable oppositions (Appendix 1.)    
 
What I can present here is limited; a hurried tour through some 
complex philosophical themes, and certainly I cannot deal with 
everything pertinent to my topic – so I will hold fast at the theoretical 
                                                 
1 In regard to James I would have run both a negative and a positive thesis.  Negatively 
I think that his take on religion reflects the general fracture of mind and world that I am 
critical of in this essay.  Positively his Pragmatism can be fed into the notion that our 
beliefs and values have an important impact on practical affairs, particularly the 
actualization of our social and institutional life. 
2 This is a term I am borrowing from John McDowell, which refers to the view of the 
world that is presupposed by naturalistic philosophers, as a causally closed law 
governed realm.  
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level.  I want us to think through the possible fate of secularism 
together, not to tell you what I think that fate is.  Yet this ought not 
lead to the sense that what I present does not reach certain 
conclusions; I do think that the issues opened up by John McDowell 
can orientate us to a more wide ranging social critique than is held in 
the text of Mind and World and I will offer the outlines of such a 
critique, not strictly McDowellian but one that does takes its 
orientation from McDowell. More radically, I will suggest that liberal 
democratic theory does seem to articulate a take on the world and a 
system of values that receives its pre-philosophical orientation from 
what might be caught under the problematic heading of ‘the 
Protestant worldview’: that liberalism is a non-metaphysical form of 
the post-reformation tradition. Thus current Anglo-American attempts 
to ‘spread democracy’ are in fact the expansion of a worldview that is 
founded in a certain religious outlook: the modern Protestant crusade 
is one that is based in a non-metaphysical formulation of the 
Protestant worldview.   
 
Whilst many of us in the Anglo-American world seem unconscious of 
this, I do not think that this point is lost on many of our friends in the 
Islamic world. Furthermore I will be arguing that Kant in particular 
raises a particularly politico-religious formulation of the liberal view to 
the level of abstract thought.    Lastly, whilst much of my focus here 
falls on the Protestant worldview, the source of the problem is in fact 
the Judeo-Christian outlook. My focus on Protestantism comes from 
my decision to make sense of the way the former outlook has fed into 
the contemporary Anglo-American political life.  In conjunction with all 
this, the secularisation thesis, the thesis that with modern liberal 
society and its scientific worldview the need for religion will dissipate 
and the bright sun of science (social and natural) shall illuminate the 
darkness, not only fails to be adequate to the empirical data, but is a 
scientistic utopia and, like all utopias, will suffer its own fate at the 
hands of the real.3   
 
John McDowell in his book Mind and World,4 currently the subject of 
intense philosophical discussion on both sides of what was once the 
 
3 Which is not to say that I support the sacralisation thesis. Rather, it is my own belief 
that the religious environment is not static; both the form and the content of religion are 
subject to flux.  Once this movement is taken account of, I think that religiosity is a 
rather consistent feature of human life.  
4 J McDowell:  Mind and World, Cambridge, 2003.  
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great philosophical divide,5 tells us that the plight of contemporary 
philosophy has been created by a problematic picture of the 
relationship between mind and world.  In regard to epistemology, he 
tells us that we are faced with two, mutually exclusive options: on one 
hand we could adopt some kind of bald naturalism whereby 
knowledge is the result of causal impacts from the external world on 
the sense organs.  On such a view the epistemic warrant for our 
beliefs lie in some causal web that is external to subjectivity – a 
causal web that we cannot access through reflection but that we can 
empirically study.  In this picture the notion that our beliefs need to be 
justified through reference to some reason for believing them drops 
away and a causal story takes the place of epistemic justification.  In 
that this view deals with law like causal interactions it is a view that is 
in harmony with a conception of nature as the realm of law.  On the 
other hand we could be led to some kind of coherentism whereby the 
only thing that can justify a belief is another belief; but then, since all 
beliefs are propositional and hence conceptually articulated, the 
causal impacts of the external world on the subject are not 
propositional and hence not conceptual and so cannot serve as 
warrants for a belief because on this view, only another belief can do 
that.  But then the world external to subjectivity in no way warrants 
our beliefs about it and thought is left spinning in the void of 
subjectivity.   
 
McDowell claims that this circumstance, whereby we are left with two 
equally unsatisfying, yet seemingly exhaustive, epistemic 
orientations, is based in a problematic picture of the relation of mind 
and world that must be jettisoned.  The big mistake, to quote from 
Charles Lamore, is to think ‘that the points at which the world acts 
causally upon us cannot consist in the exercise of our conceptual 
capacities.’6  Naturalists seem to believe ‘that such points somehow 
initiate conceptual thinking, and coherentists that they are, by their 
nature, unsuited to instruct our thought.’7 The solution for McDowell is 
to recognise that the world itself ‘is given as already possessed of a 
conceptual structure, already bound up in relations of warrant and 
implication.’8 So the causal impacts on the sense organs are always 
already conceptual – the conceptual extends all the way out. 
 
5 N Smith: Reading McDowell: On Mind and World, London, 2003, 1. 
6 C Lamore: Attending to reasons, London, 2003, 197. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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This feeds McDowell’s ethics, for now ‘the ethical is a domain of 
rational requirements, which are there in any case, whether we are 
responsive to them or not’9 – in other words, because of the 
conceptual structure of experience certain kinds of experience place 
normative constraints upon us.  Whether we are able to recognise 
these demands, and so be responsive to them, depends on 
upbringing and whether we have cultivated ‘the conceptual capacities 
necessary to discern them’10 – but they are there regardless of our 
capacity to discern them.  In other words whether we can recognise 
the normative constraints of a certain situation or state of affairs 
depends on what features of that situation we are attuned to by our 
enculturation.  One mode of enculturation will attune us to certain 
morally salient features of a situation, but miss others; another mode 
of upbringing will attune us to a different set.  Cross-cultural or 
intersubjective exchanges then become a matter of pointing out what 
features of a situation one finds morally salient and listening to what 
the other finds morally salient in the same situation, thus such 
intercultural interchange can expand our moral horizons.  This avoids 
the pitfalls of cultural relativism whilst paying culture its dues and it 
avoids the pitfalls of ethical universalism whereby we assume that 
there is only one warranted ethical take on the world – felicitously it 
just happens to be our own ethical take on the world that is the one 
warranted take. (As a side note; such a view predominates in the 
current Anglo-American political climate which has, unfortunately in 
my view, rendered the notion of freedom a dirty word, or at least one 
that I am increasingly ashamed to use).11
 
What about secularism?  Lets consider how this feeds into the idea of 
the disenchantment of nature by returning to the two epistemic views 
already mentioned.  From the perspective of the naturalist, the 
perspective of modern Science, nature is a realm governed by law-
like causal interactions and from this realm the notion of sui generis 
meaning is excluded.12  Furthermore it is usual for those who hold to 
this view to construe those who challenge it as desiring some kind of 
 
9 Ibid, quoting McDowell, 202. 
10 Ibid, 202. 
11 Although I think that my understanding of that term diverges somewhat from the 
understanding of George W. Bush, the mismatch between these conceptions cannot 
really be explored here. 
12 R Bernstein: McDowell’s domesticated Hegelianism, London, 2003, 16-17. 
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anachronistic return to the pre-modern superstitious enchanted view 
of nature.13  Those who take nature as a realm of meaning can be 
seen as working against science.  McDowell’s position is not to deny 
the importance of the scientific notion of nature but to suggest that if 
we limit our conception of nature thus, we are led into thinking about 
things in terms of unhelpful dichotomies (Appendix 1). For there is no 
place for meaning in the realm of law, any meaning that we perceive 
in it is just a blanket thrown over the world by the human mind 
desperate to come to terms with its own physical and cognitive 
finitude.   
 
Now if we follow McDowell on this, we are led to something 
instructive about Kantian philosophy which McDowell’s book gives us 
occasion to think about.  Before I discuss this, let me just say that in 
both analytic and continental philosophy, Kant is commonly seen as 
the point of divergence for the two schools. There are two ways of 
reading Kant: one can focus on the first critique, which essentially 
establishes a system of epistemic warrant for empirical experience 
whereby the latter is equated with the realm described by Newtonian 
science.  On this view Kant’s major contribution is to epistemology 
and the philosophy of science, which, after transformations and 
revisions stacked on transformations and revisions, feeds into the 
modern analytic school with its strong emphasis on science.14  
Alternatively one can take a path out of Kant which focuses on the 
second and third critiques, a path taken by post-Kantian thinkers, 
focusing on: ethics as first philosophy, the notion of transcendental 
freedom, and the way judgment bridges the gap between nature and 
the transcendental freedom which grounds Kantian ethics.15  Taking 
this path, again after transformations and revisions stacked on 
transformations and revisions, feeds into the modern continental 
tradition.16   
 
Returning to McDowell, central to the Kantian view is a strong 
dichotomy between nature and freedom.  For McDowell Kant 
uncritically accepted the idea of a disenchanted nature.17  This is 
what empirical experience presents us, nature as a realm of law, a 
 
13 Ibid. 
14 S Critchley: Continental Philosophy: A very short introduction, Oxford, 2001, 16-19. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bernstein, op cit, 17. 
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spatio-temporal web of law like causal interactions.  This is all that we 
can encounter in experience; it is all that we can know empirically.  
But for Kant there is also a transcendental dimension.  Kant claims 
that autonomy is the supreme principle of morality,18 yet the notion of 
autonomy cuts against the deterministic picture of the Newtonian 
world and so Kant is forced into the distinction between the empirical 
and the transcendental whereby empirically we are purely determined 
– and this is all we are warranted to know but despite this cognitive 
limitation, we must postulate that transcendentally we are free and 
autonomous.  This creates a distinction between the empirical 
subject, bound by the laws of science and so fully determined, and 
the rational subject who is transcendentally free and thus morally 
autonomous. 
 
This feeds into a distinction between morality and legality, creating an 
ethical gap between the rational subject and the laws of the state.  
For Kant the state is the realm in which the law operates; the law 
achieves its end, the regulation of society, through the exercise of 
legitimate authority, through compulsion and coercion.  It achieves its 
ends by appealing to the conative side of human nature: if you desire 
to live without pain, avoid breaking the law; if you break the law, the 
state can legitimately exercise is coercive authority over you.  The 
law, for Kant, is set up as a system of causal push and pull – much 
like the realm of Newtonian science.  The law is objectively codified 
and it is the instrument of an objective authority, the state.  From the 
perspective of the law what is of interest is whether a citizen acts 
according to the law; it focuses on the external action of citizens.  On 
the other hand morality, the determination and pursuit of the good 
life, is not the business of the state. Morality is the business of the 
subject and it is radically internal; if motivations for doing right are 
moral motivations then they have their origin purely in the reflections 
of the subject who sees that a certain course of action is morally 
obligatory.  Nothing guarantees that morality and legality will be in 
harmony; the state demands obedience to law, morality demands 
that I am true to an inner principle.  There is a radical distinction 
between the inner realm of the rational subject and the external realm 
of the law.  The law can compel me to act in a certain way but cannot 
compel me to believe in a certain way. Particularly, it cannot compel 
me to believe something is good when I in fact do not.   
 
18 H Allison: Idealism and Freedom, Cambridge, 1996, 134. 
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Thus morality is the realm of individual freedom of conscience. Kant 
is pursuing religious tolerance through freedom of conscience and, 
theory aside, the background to this is firstly Kant’s own Pietistic 
upbringing, but also a response to the religious wars of the 
seventeenth century. Yet, qua philosophical doctrine, all this rests 
upon the idea that one can differentiate oneself into the rational 
subject, or the self qua inner being which is a self legislator, and an 
empirical subject, or the self qua outer being which must act in 
accordance with positive law. Thus in Kant the sphere of authority 
that is given to the state and legality is the empirical realm of 
objectivity, but the sphere of authority that is given to morality is the 
inner realm of rational subjectivity.  The state can only regulate law 
and its institutional manifestations; it has no say in what an individual 
ought to determine is good, and it should avoid any institutional 
association with determination of the good life.  The church is 
focused on the transcendental realm, it is focused on the good, and 
can develop conceptions of the good life, but it has no legitimate 
coercive power and cannot compel anyone to accept its take.  Thus 
religious association or disassociation is left to the inner sphere of the 
rational subject to determine according to conscience. The individual 
must determine whether they accept a certain conception of the good 
life or reject it in favour of another, or even perhaps suspend their 
judgment about it. 
 
Note how this distinction is in harmony with contemporary Anglo-
American liberal thinkers, particularly those who are influenced by 
Kant, like John Rawls and perhaps also Martha Nussbaum.  Take 
this quote from the Rawlsian political thinker, Will Kymlicka: 
 
According to Rawls, liberals have simply extended the 
principle of tolerance to other controversial questions 
about meaning, value and the purpose of human life… But 
if liberalism can indeed be seen as an extension of the 
principle of religious tolerance, it is important to recognise 
that religious tolerance in the West has taken a specific 
form – namely the idea of individual freedom of 
conscience.19     
 
 
19 W Kymlicka: Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford, 2002, 230. 
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Thus, a fundamental tenet of liberalism, one that I think we see 
decaying before our eyes, is that a government ought to have no 
substantive take on the good life but rather ought to let the individual 
determine their own conception of it (so long as this does not impinge 
upon other people’s pursuit of their own conception of the good life).  
The state has legitimate coercive power in so far as such coercion is 
necessary to ensure the freedom of each in harmony with the 
freedom of all.  The state is the only institution with such coercive 
power over citizens; other institutions can have a take on the good 
life but they have no coercive power. Morality, a discourse on the 
good and the good life, is relegated to the sphere of ‘individual 
freedom of conscience.’20 What an individual is willing to accept as 
good is left to them.  All the state can do is try to develop the external 
or empirical conditions conducive to the pursuit of the good life – by 
securing certain primary goods needed to pursue the good life, but 
especially through the establishment of a constitution that facilitates 
‘individual freedom of conscience.’21
 
Two quick points on this: that liberalism resonates with elements of 
Protestantism ought not be at all surprising given the context in which 
it develops.  One need only look at the foundational liberal theorists 
studied by undergraduates in political philosophy to see this – 
Hobbes, Locke, and more problematically Rousseau (who began as 
a Protestant, converted to Catholicism and then reconverted to 
Protestantism).  Later of course they will probably go on to study 
Kant, and, of course, the philosopher who has been dubbed the 
Protestant Aquinas; Hegel.  This led to one of my Canadian students 
commenting that in Anglo-American contexts, political philosophy 
was better described as the history and philosophy of liberalism.  
Secondly, to return to the throwaway line above where I said that the 
notion that a government ought to have no substantive take on the 
good, is currently decaying before our eyes.22  I think that the reason 
for the decay lies in the problematic nature of the relation between 
mind and world, subject and object, inner and outer and particularly 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Here I am thinking of the emergence in America of the New Christian Right as a 
force in politics, but also to the presidency of George W Bush, a convert to evangelical 
Christianity.  Both seek to bring ‘traditional values,’ or a thick conception of the good 
life back into the political and into a more direct dialogue with the government’s 
legislative wing.  That success here has been limited has probably been more a factor 
of institutional limitations. 
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the idea that legality and morality can, somehow, be kept separate 
(Appendix 1).  I think that the decay is an indication that we are 
moving off from flawed presuppositions and artificial distinctions that 
make sense in the abstract but are inadequate to the real.  
 
Of course the American Declaration of Independence owes more to 
the Anglo-Protestant tradition than it does to the Germano-Protestant 
tradition.  It begins from an atomistic conception of the human being, 
from what Taylor describes as ‘disembedded individuals who come to 
associate together, each, in pursuing his of her own purpose in life, 
acts to benefit others.’23 It is based in a conception of human nature 
whereby human beings, qua created beings, qua God’s creatures, 
were seen as created equal and also to be the possessors of 
inalienable, God given, rights.24  But in so far as the individual so 
conceived was the basis of the declaration we can understand the 
declaration as a document which aims to found a moral order 
established by God.25  To me all of this seems to refer us more to 
Locke than any other major political thinker in the Anglo tradition.  Yet 
as Taylor points out ‘[w]hen this plan was understood as providential 
and the moral order seen as natural law, which is the law of God then 
building a society that fulfils these requirements was seen as fulfilling 
the design of God … The fundamental idea that America had a 
vocation to carry out God’s purposes has to be understood in relation 
to the conception of an order of free, rights bearing individuals.’26    
 
With growing disenchantment and the changing nature of American 
society, this picture is rendered problematic.   There is still a sense 
that America is founded on the notion of some universal moral order, 
this is, pure and simple, America’s ‘great’ contribution to modern 
political life – a conception of itself as the embodiment of a universal 
moral order. But for many Americans, this moral order can now no 
longer be providential in nature, rather it must by grounded on some 
other principles: for instance, some unchallengeable a priori 
principles which are, apparently, universalisable.  Thus many 
contemporary American liberal thinkers are led back to some kind of 
Kantian approach in an attempt to ‘rescue the constitution from 
 
23 C Taylor: Varieties of Religion Today: William James revisited, Cambridge, 2003, 67. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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God’27 by anchoring it in universal reason.  Just how much this 
rescues the constitution from God and how much it anchors the 
constitution in a non-metaphysical expression of Anglo-Protestant 
values is the decisive question. 
 
Lets deepen this by returning to Kant by way of the early Hegel and 
consider one way that the Kantian distinction between morality and 
legality comes under fire.  Hegel has a conception of community life 
as the bearer and sustainer of freedom and rationality.28  Neither 
human rationality nor the notion of freedom are separable from the 
form of life in which any individual is embedded.  We can feed 
Hegel’s claim about rationality back into McDowell’s thesis.  If 
experience is always already conceptually structured, so that our 
experience brings with it a conceptual structure, then experience itself 
will provide us reasons, warrants or constraints to the way we act, 
what we say, and how we judge.  But it is our life in our community, 
our social and historical context, that is going to orientate us to that 
experience in such a way as to facilitate our discovery of its 
conceptual features – and of course certain communities may 
orientate themselves differently.  What features we strike upon thus 
determine the reasons we can give for saying or acting or judging the 
way we do.   
 
Thus reason and rationality cannot be seen as some power divorced 
from the social; some transcendental capacity, but essentially social 
and historical and bound to our communal sense makings.  So the 
idea that reason is universal in form and content seems false, 
rationality as a capacity might be universal in distribution but in terms 
of its content, it is particular.  Now the level of social or political 
freedom that a community achieves depends upon what conceptual 
features a community is orientated towards.  Kant is right to link 
freedom to rationality the way that he has, but he is wrong to think of 
reason as something transcendent – rather it is embedded in forms of 
life.   
 
But now the social institutions of the church and the state cannot be 
differentiated the way Kantian political philosophy differentiates them, 
because the distinction between the rational and empirical subjects 
 
27 Ibid, 70. 
28 H S Harris, translator, Hegel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford, 
1972,170. 
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has collapsed.  The empirical subject is rational and embedded in a 
realm that is always already conceptual and therefore a realm that 
always already carries reasons.  Thus there cannot be such a radical 
distinction between the moral and the legal and so in order to 
organise political life: in order to structure the legal, one has to have 
recourse to the moral; legality has to orientate itself according to the 
values of the community.  Also because the political realm facilitates 
practical activity, it must also help in the cultivation of the individuals 
within it. It helps to orientate them to their experience and it is always 
already attuning them to morally salient facts.  Thus the moral and 
the legal are always bound together; the legal receives its orientation 
from the features of the world that the society as a form of life finds 
morally salient and through its social role the legal helps to educate 
those who are born into or enter that form of life to what is morally 
salient within it and thus provides moral continuity. 
 
The distinction between the rational and the empirical subject is 
artificial, the distinction between the moral and the legal is artificial 
and the distinction between the mind and the world is artificial.  All of 
this needs to be overcome, not necessarily rejected, what is 
necessary is that we give up the simplistic distinctions and deepen 
our thinking about these issues.  I am certainly not urging a return to 
notions of unitary Christendom, nor am I urging that we give up on 
the idea of religious and cultural pluralism, nor saying that the political 
and the religious must be bed partners. What I am saying is that we 
need to rethink the whole contrivance, from the ground up. 
 
Now McDowell’s thoughts can be deepened through looking at the 
form of life that gives rise to this problematic picture in its pre-
philosophical manifestations.  Philosophy does not happen in a 
vacuum, it emerges out of a life world that is its precondition and one 
of the interesting facets of post-Kantian idealism is that it has, at an 
abstract level, an interest in the historical origins of philosophical 
predicaments; it attends to the kinds of attitudes that give rise to the 
kind of problematic picture that McDowell discusses.  It is my 
contention that a whole series of problematic distinctions, dualisms or 
dichotomies emerge out of the Judeo-Christian conceptual grid.  
These distinctions are based in the way we ‘think’ our world.  This 
constrains us to move in certain directions, to do certain things, to say 
certain things and to judge things in certain ways.  These distinctions, 
through this normative constraint, seem to set us on a certain 
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trajectory, which, whilst those distinctions are held to, seem almost 
unavoidable in the same way that McDowell tells us that if we buy a 
certain picture of the relation of the mind to the world, we get caught 
in an interminable oscillation between naturalism and coherentism.   
 
I think that McDowell is correct, but I think that the distinction that he 
makes between mind and world is founded upon a prior distinction 
between self and world, or to make the point more distinctive, 
between self and nature.  This distinction has been carried from our 
religious tradition into our intellectual tradition and from our 
intellectual tradition into our social institutions, but if the original 
distinction is problematic and flawed then we are in trouble.  I contend 
that it is flawed. I contend that the original distinction is based in a 
form of self-alienation, a fractured or schizoid view of the self that has 
led us into fractured and schizoid intellectual moves and social 
institutions.  So let us now explore the basis of this through the early 
Hegel on fate and spirit. I will work with these early accounts not 
because they are fully representative of Hegel’s mature view but, 
firstly and foremost, because I think that one can get a more radical 
reading out of the social and political thinking of the early Hegel.  
Indeed the latter Hegel seems to argue that Protestantism is an end 
point for socio-religious development because it has most adequately 
grasped and realised the principle of freedom.  Now whilst they do 
not necessarily receive this idea from Hegel, I would suggest that 
many Anglo-American politicians also hold the same convictions 
about it, so the views of the latter Hegel are more in harmony with the 
attitude I am criticising.  Lastly I will focus on the early Hegel’s 
writings because they are accessible to the non-specialist and take 
us as far as I think we need go for the purposes of this paper. 
 
Hegel’s interest in fate is directed to the fate of social groupings.  For 
Hegel the fate of a people is directly related to its spirit or Geist, 
which if you understand it correctly, is to say that the fate of a people 
is directly related to its form of life.  A rudimentary outline of a theory 
of spirit or Geist is present in his earliest writings where the term 
Geist is used to describe the self-consciousness of a community.  In 
particular the term is used in reference to modalities of thought and 
action in which a community becomes conscious of its own 
particularity qua community.29  Hegel tells us that the spirit of a 
 
29 Ibid, 273. 
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people is the nexus of its history, religious and political life, each of 
which are peculiar ways through which a community can relate to 
itself, or be conscious of itself without being conscious that this is 
what is occurring through them.  Yet none of these alone are 
sufficient to be regarded as that people’s Spirit, only the unity of the 
three.30  Hegel tells us: 
 
The [S]pirit of a people <is> its history, its religion, the level 
of political freedom – [these things] cannot be treated 
separately either with respect to their mutual influence, or 
in characterising them [each by itself.]31
  
Yet these modalities of social self-consciousness are not only the 
product of the communities’ self-relation but also shape its thinking.32 
These three forms of community self-consciousness are grounded in 
a normative system that they, qua discourses, help to articulate whilst 
themselves being shaped by those norms.  So the Spirit of a people 
is not only its history, political structure and religion but also 
simultaneously orientates its particular historical, political and 
religious outlook.  Spirit is a way a community can think its self, but 
that form of thinking in itself shapes what is thought. 
 
One must avoid thinking of this relationship, between a people and its 
Spirit, as a relationship between two particulars that are external to 
each other, as if the spirit of a people is something lying over and 
above that people.  It is better understood as a relation of reciprocity 
and mutuality, neither part having ontological priority over its other.  A 
people and its spirit come together as a living whole; without the 
activity of the parts the whole would not exist, and without the 
integration and orientation of the whole the parts would dissolve.  
Whilst it is theoretically possible to separate the elements for the 
purpose of abstract analysis, no actual separation can occur; a 
people cannot be considered separate from its spirit without 
destroying or killing its character as a people.  It is this organic 
relation between a people and its Spirit that constitutes its mode of 
existence as its way of ‘life’.  
 
 
30 G W F Hegel: The Tübingen Fragment of 1793, in H S Harris, translator, Hegel’s 
Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford, 1972, 506. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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As it develops this theory of Spirit becomes more explicitly attitudinal, 
more explicitly normative; a mode of comportment towards the world 
that defines for us how we ought to judge what we find, defining what 
matters and what does not.  To express this in philosophical, 
language Geist becomes a system of normative constraints that to a 
large degree define the possibilities for self-relation and relation to 
other.  Hence Hegel will say in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate 
that ‘The same spirit which had carried Abraham away from his kin 
led him through encounters with foreign peoples during the rest of his 
life; this was the spirit of self-maintenance in strict opposition to 
everything.’33 Abraham is here characterised as a figure who adopts 
a certain orientation to the world, by breaking away from an old form 
of Geist and actively constituting a new one.  What defines this new 
mode of Geist?  The world for Abraham is something radically 
separate or other. This shapes Abraham’s interaction with the world, 
his beliefs, his judgments and through this his actions.34 It is an 
attitude that he bequeaths to his progeny and hence shapes their 
own attitudes and likewise it shapes their historical, political and 
religious self-consciousness.  Spirit is thus a system of norms that 
define our relation to the world by orientating our judgments about it; 
it constrains, although it does not completely determine, our thinking 
by defining what are appropriate responses or judgments to make 
about that world.   
 
Before I go on let me clarify what I mean here by normative 
constraint. I have used it above, but now I am saying that talk of 
Geist is in fact talk of normative constraints and so we need to be 
clear on this.  I am not talking about some kind of strict cultural 
determinism.  The term is used as a shorthand way of saying that 
one is constrained to say certain things, do certain things or make 
certain judgments about the world, through a conception of what one 
ought say, ought to do or ought to judge – which of course does not 
mean that one will in fact say, do or judge that way.  For instance if 
someone extends the hand of friendship to me, I ought to extend 
mine back if I want to continue in friendly relations with that person; 
nothing forces me to do so, but I do feel the normative pull, the 
constraint, to do so when the hand is extended.  Okay, so by 
normative I mean some obligatory force, but this could be resisted.  
 
33 G W F Hegel: The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, T M Knox (trans), in Early 
Theological Writings,  Philadelphia, 1996, 185-6.  
34 Ibid. 
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Let me now say that what I mean when I discuss this kind of 
constraint is something even more particular; I am in fact talking 
about conceptual constraint – which if you have attended to what I 
have said about McDowell ought to prick a few ears.  By this I mean 
that there are concepts whereby the mere possession of that concept 
gives me a reason for saying, doing or judging things in a particular 
way. Conceptual constraint is a compact way of saying that certain 
concepts are action guiding; the mere possession of the concept 
provides a reason for me to act, say or judge in particular way.35 For 
instance A.W. Moore says that anyone who possesses the concept 
of blasphemy thereby has a reason not to blaspheme, unless of 
course they aim to undermine the status of that concept.  Knowing 
what blasphemy is itself provides some normative constraints, some 
reason, that weighs against the practice of blaspheming.36  Or, again 
from A.W. Moore, anyone who possesses the concept of a promise 
thereby has a reason for keeping them, unless of course they seek to 
undermine the institution of promising.37  I think we get the picture.  A 
norm is action-guiding but not action determining.  Now if we accept 
McDowell’s contention that experience is always already 
conceptually structured and that our upbringing attunes us to certain 
conceptual features of that experience, then we can see that in 
Hegelian terms experience is always already Geistlich, always 
already normative. 
 
Now, to the subject of fate, Hegel uses fate in two senses. Firstly 
‘universal fate;’ an impersonal force before which everything must 
yield.38  This is essentially the power of nature and it is applied to all 
peoples in a relatively even handed way and so, at first, it does not 
seem to be able to generate particular cultural or community self-
consciousness.  For Hegel this absolute or universal fate is brought 
into relation with another sense of fate, particularistic fate.  
Particularistic fate is not impersonal, it is viewed as the product of a 
will, but nonetheless it is still naturalistic in that it is emptied of any 
supernatural elements.  The ground of particularistic fate is a 
peoples’ capacity for a relation to an ‘other’. This is born from an 
encounter with an ‘other’ that simultaneously forces that people into 
 
35 A W Moore: Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and variations in Kant’s 
moral and religious philosophy, London, 2003,39. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Harris, op cit, 273-4. 
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self-relation.  The ground of the fate of any particular people is ‘the 
genuine spiritual self-awareness of a people’39 which can only arise 
through relation to an ‘other’.  Thus particularistic fate has its ground 
in the consciousness of the people itself for, without this kind of self-
consciousness, this self-awareness in relation to an ‘other,’ fate 
would not arise.   
 
This ‘genuine spiritual self-awareness’40 in relation to an ‘other,’ 
emerges as part of a twofold process.  The first step in this process is 
a sense of a breach with nature conceived as an impersonal force, a 
sense that we are able to lose ourselves from the ‘deterministic’ 
forces of universal fate.  The nascent social ‘we,’ or in the case of 
Abraham the individual, begins to see itself as something apart from 
the realm of nature, not entirely subject to universal fate.  For Hegel 
this is generally the result of an experience whereby what was once 
hospitable and homely suddenly presents itself as inhospitable and 
unhomely.  Perhaps the world with which we once identified and saw 
as being hospitable to our plans, suddenly presents itself in such a 
way that we can no longer judge it to be so – we are suddenly 
orientated to new facets of its conceptual structure.  Though, whilst 
there is this separation or breach with nature, the people or the 
individual simultaneously views itself as, at least in part, subject to its 
now inhospitable force or open to its influence.   
 
On this view of the world, nature is a blind system that operates 
without regard for human needs, in so far as ‘we’ are in nature, we 
can be subject to its push and pull, but because ‘we’ also see 
ourselves as something apart from nature, or separate from it, we are 
able to resist this push and pull.  This breach is a product of 
consciousness, a breach in thought, but this breach in thought is 
taken to be a real breach. It is rendered metaphysical.   Ultimately 
this breach is a form of self-alienation, the human being, qua natural 
being, denies that it is natural and instead posits that what is 
essential to it is something non-natural, supernatural.  I think that one 
of the greatest failures of modern philosophical imagination is the 
seeming inability to see the human being, and the world for that 
matter, as entirely natural and yet still as spiritual – so deeply have 
we associated spirituality with transcendence and ‘God’ that we can 
no longer view the world as anything but a purely material thing and 
 
39 Ibid, 274. 
40 Ibid. 
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conversely we cannot see ourselves as spiritual apart from a relation 
to ‘God’. So instead of seeing the world as both a system of causal 
relations and a system of meaning the notion of meaning is 
jettisoned.  Hegel and McDowell in different ways seem to urge us to 
break with this. I agree. 
 
By itself this way of conceiving our relation to nature is not sufficient 
for the production of the kind of self-awareness that typifies spirit; 
such self-awareness comes ‘only when [the people in question] 
deliberately adopt towards other peoples the attitude that they have 
reactively adopted towards the revealed might of universal fate.’41 
Thus other peoples are taken to be entirely part of the system of 
universal impersonal fate; entirely part of nature.  Thus the attitude 
that we take towards nature as a purely impersonal and inhospitable 
force we extend to other peoples, they are other (Anderssein).  Again 
this originates in consciousness, it is a product of reflection, it is a 
breach in thought and again it is a form of self-alienation, a form of 
violence done by consciousness to itself.  It is humanity dividing itself 
against itself.   
 
This distinction between our people and all others, is merely a 
distinction in thought. It is an abstraction, but it has been rendered a 
metaphysical distinction.  It is here that ‘genuine spiritual self-
consciousness’ arises, this is the birthplace of the spirit of a people – 
the voluntary or willed breach with the rest of humanity by identifying 
them with the world and ourselves with something outside of it.  We 
chose to understand them in the same terms that we understand 
nature.  Thus this breach is the product of a will and not something 
impersonal.  It is the character or attitude of the latter voluntary 
breach that determines the fate of the people that creates that 
breach, but it ought to be recognised that the character of that 
voluntary breach is itself determined by our reaction to the initial 
breach with nature42 and is merely an extension of that breach.  
Thus, the attitude towards nature, our orientation to nature, is 
extended to other human beings to become a form of life, a way of 
relating to self and other and so the fate of a people is itself 
determined by the norms governing their forms of life. 
 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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Now we must note something about this breach with nature, we must 
note the attitude that comes with it.  In Abraham’s willed breach with 
nature, nature becomes an inhospitable, unruly other which threatens 
the very existence of Abraham qua subject.  So, Hegel tells us: 
 
Mastery was the only possible relationship in which 
Abraham could stand to the infinite world opposed to him; 
but he was unable himself to make this mastery actual, 
and he therefore remained ceded to his ideal.  He himself 
also stood under his Ideal’s dominion, but the idea was 
present in his mind, he served the idea, and so he enjoyed 
his Ideal’s favour; and since its divinity was rooted in his 
contempt for the whole world, he remained its only 
favourite.43
 
But what is the idea to which Hegel is here alluding?  The Idea, 
whose Ideal is the Judeo-Christian God, is the result of viewing the 
entirety of the world ‘outside’ of subjectivity as hostile to the ‘inner’ life 
of the subject.44 Now this is just a judgment about the world that we 
live in and does not move that far beyond what is given in experience 
except to say that what is given in experience is a world hostile to the 
subject.  But if the outer was hostile to the inner, then the subject was 
in a state of complete insecurity so the outer had to be mastered45 – 
this leads to the Idea or thought of ‘the mastery of nature,’ and, 
transforming this abstract idea into an ideal, we are led to the 
master/mastered relation wherein the master (God) must be 
somehow distinct from or alien to what is mastered (nature).  This 
notion of the mastery of nature is in fact a product of thought that 
arises out of a particular view of nature (as a hostile other), this 
thought of the mastery of nature is not something that Abraham can 
experience through his own powers; he cannot in fact master nature, 
and so it is transformed into the thought-ideal of the Judeo-Christian 
God who is seen as sufficient to that idea.  This thought-ideal is 
ontologised, and becomes the thought of an actual individual and 
concrete being God.46
 
 
43 G W F Hegel: The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, in T M Knox (trans), in Early 
Theological Writtings,  Philadelphia, 1996, 187. 
44 Ibid, 182-3. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid,183. 
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This breach with nature is in my opinion the original fracture on which 
the subsequent fractures are built.  At a cosmological level it result in 
a schizoid metaphysics; a divided universe, whereby on one side we 
have nature which is merely a bounded, finite and impersonal system 
and on the other side we have spirit which is unbounded and infinite, 
personalised through the notion of God.  Where does that peculiar 
mode of being we call humanity fit into this picture? Well, closer to 
God than to nature.  But how is this so when it seems as if we are 
much like animals and other natural products?  Well, yes we are 
natural bodies that are objective just like other natural products, but 
we also know ourselves to be subjects. Surely this inner realm of 
subjectivity lies closer to that which is separate from nature, closer to 
God than to nature.   
 
Nature is bounded by law, hence the body is bounded by law, but 
qua subjects we are transcendentally free and so capable of seeking 
out the good.  When this kind of picture is taken up into our 
intellectual tradition, when it is abstracted and turned into an 
intellectualised picture of the relation of subject to object, mind to 
world, we are led down a path that leads through the history of 
modern philosophy, but part of the history of philosophy is the history 
of political philosophy and so this picture cannot but haunt our 
thinking about the social and the political, and the institutions that 
reflect political life, which always emerge from the way we 
understand our relation to our world; always the expression of Geist.  
In order to discover the fate of secularism we need to attend firstly to 
this problematic picture, based in fracture, but secondly we have to 
attend to the normative constraints that come with this fracture, we 
have to attend to the way it orientates us to the world, and see how it 
constrains our thoughts, our words, our deeds, our theories, our 
institutions and our relations to other peoples.  
 
McDowell talks about an interminable oscillation in epistemic theory 
between naturalism and coherentism, but we are also caught in the 
tension between God and Nature; as the organising principle of our 
life worlds, these two categories are always at play within our social, 
intellectual and institutional lives.  Perhaps God dominates the 
picture and the natural is minimised. Perhaps the natural dominates 
and God is minimised.  But when our emphasis on one side starts to 
decay, we seem constrained to fall back upon its other.  Secularism 
was born out of a Judeo-Christian view of the world; it is born within 
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this fracture. In its contemporary manifestation it seems to have 
overcome a worldview where social, cultural and political pluralism 
was preserved through religious universalism (written at the 
institutional rather than the local level) – crudely, pre-reformation 
Europe.   However, modern secularism has sought social and 
political unity through promoting religious plurality, but in order to 
preserve religious pluralism it seems as if we now have to 
universalise the political – the universalisation of liberal democratic 
political theory, a process that the Anglo-American world seems to 
have taken up with an almost religious zeal, at least since the 1950’s 
but which seems to be a strong element in contemporary Anglo-
American foreign policy.  So, and here I will end, perhaps 
contemporary Anglo-American political life is the result of such a 
fractured relation to the world, and perhaps the fate of secularism is 
the universalisation of America, the New Jerusalem – the new City of 
God. 
Buddha of Suburbia  
 
22 
 
APPENDIX 1 
  
 
 
  
Table of Fracture 
 
Mind  World 
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Normative Natural 
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Particular Universal 
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